Computer-aided decision making-where a human decision-maker is aided by a computational classifier in making a decision-is becoming increasingly prevalent. For instance, judges in at least nine states make use of algorithmic tools meant to determine "recidivism risk scores" for criminal defendants in sentencing, parole, or bail decisions. A subject of much recent debate is whether such algorithmic tools are "fair" in the sense that they do not discriminate against certain groups (e.g., races) of people.
As more and more data is becoming easily available, and with vast increases in the power of machine learning, there are an increasing number of situations where algorithms-classifiers-are used to help decision makers in challenging situations. Examples range from algorithms assisting drivers in cars, to algorithmic methods for determining credit scores, to algorithms helping judges to make sentencing and pretrial decisions in criminal justice. While such computer-aided decision making has presented unparalleled levels of accuracy and is becoming increasingly ubiquitous, one of the primary concerns with its widespread adoption is the possibility for such algorithmic methods to lead to structural biases and discriminatory practices [12] . A malicious algorithm designer, for instance, might explicitly encode discriminatory rules into a classifier. Perhaps even more problematically, a machine learning method may overfit the data and infer a bias, may inherit a bias from poorly collected data, or may simply be designed to optimize some loss function that leads to discriminatory outcomes.
A well-known instance where this concern has come to light is the debate surrounding the COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions) tool for recidivism analysis, a classification algorithm that is becoming increasingly Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. AIES '19, January 27-28, 2019, Honolulu, HI, USA © 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6324-2/19/01. . . $15.00 https://doi.org /10.1145/3306618.3314242 widely used in the criminal justice system. Given a series of answers to questions concerning criminal defendants' backgrounds and characteristics, this tool outputs scores from 1 (low risk) to 10 (high risk) estimating how likely they are to recidivate (commit a future crime) or to recidivate violently. According to a recent study by ProPublica [2] , COMPAS and similar risk assessment algorithms are becoming increasingly widely-used throughout the United States; their results are already being shown to judges in nine states during criminal sentencing, and are used in courts nationwide for pretrial decisions such as assigning bail. The ProPublica study, however, found an alarming trend in a set of data collected [1] concerning individuals' COMPAS results and their actual rates of recidivism over the next two years; in particular, it was found that the scores output by COMPAS lead to a disparate treatment of minorities. For instance, in the data collected, African-American defendants who did not recidivate were found to be almost twice as likely as white defendants (44.85%, compared to 23.45%) to have been assigned a high risk score (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) .
Fairness, or non-discrimination, in classification has been studied and debated extensively in the recent past (see [3] for an extremely thorough overview); research concerning definitions of fairness in classification dates back to [11] and [6] , with more recent definitions tailored to deal with the above-mentioned problems appearing in [2, 5, 8, 9] . To make this setting more concrete, consider some distribution D from which individuals σ are sampled, and consider some classifier C(·) that given some observable features O(σ ) produces some outcome, which later will be used by a decisionmaker (DM). The DM is ultimately only interested in the actual class f (σ ) ∈ Ψ of the individual σ , and their goal is to output some decision x ∈ Ω DM correlated with this actual class. For instance, in the setting of the COMPAS data collected in [1, 2] , D is the distribution over defendants σ , the class f (σ ) is a bit indicating whether the defendant σ actually commits a crime in the next two years, and the job of the classifier is to output a risk score, which will then be seen and acted upon by a judge. Note that we may without loss of generality assume that the class of the individual is fully determined by σ -situations where the class is probabilistically decided (e.g., at the time of classification, it has yet to be determined whether an individual will or won't recidivate) can be captured by simply including these future coin-tosses needed to determine it into σ , and simply making sure they are not part of the observable features O(σ ).
Additionally, an individual σ is part of some group д(σ ) ∈ Gfor instance, in the COMPAS setting, the group is the race of the individual. We will refer to the tuple P = (D, f , д, O) as a classification context. Given such a classification context P, we let Ψ P denote the range of f , and G P denote the range of д. Whenever the classification context P is clear from context, we drop the subscript; additionally, whenever the distribution D, д are clear from context, we use σ to denote a random variable that is distributed according to D, and σ X to denote the random variable distributed according to D conditioned on д(σ ) = X .
In this work, we will explore a tension between fairness for the classifier and fairness for the DM. Roughly speaking, our main result shows that except in "trivial" classification contexts, either the classifier needs to be discriminatory, or a rational decision-maker using the output of the classifier is forced to be discriminatory. Let us turn to describing these two different perspectives on fairness.
Fairness for the Classifier: Fair Treatment. The notion of statistical parity [6] (which is essentially identical to the notion of causal effect [11] ) captures non-discrimination between groups by simply requiring that the output of the classifier be independent (or almost independent) of the group of the individual; that is, for any two groups X and Y , the distributions {C(O(σ X ))} and {C(O(σ Y ))} are ϵ-close in statistical distance. This is a very strong notion of fairness, and in the above-mentioned context it may not make sense. In particular, if the base rates (i.e. the probabilities that individuals from different groups are part of a certain class) are different, we should perhaps not expect the output distribution of the classifier to be the same across groups. Indeed, as the ProPublica article points out, in the COMPAS example, the overall recidivism probability among African-American defendants was 56%, whereas it was 42% among white defendants. Thus, in such situations, one would reasonably expect a classifier to on average output a higher risk score for African-American defendants, which would violate statistical parity. Indeed, the issue raised by ProPublica authors was that, even after taking this base difference into account (more precisely, even after conditioning on individuals that did not recidivate), there was a significant difference in how the classifier treated the two races.
The notion of equalized odds in [8] formalizes the desiderata articulated by the authors of the ProPublica study (for the case of recidivism) in a general setting by requiring the output of the classifier to be independent of the group of the individuals, after conditioning on the class of the individuals. 1 We here consider an approximate version of this notion-which we refer to as ϵ-fair treatment-which requires that, for any two groups X and Y and any class c, the distributions
are ϵ-close with respect to some appropriate distance metric to be defined shortly. That is, in the COMPAS example, if we restrict to individuals that actually do not recidivate (respectively, those that do), the output of the classifier ought to be essentially independent of the group of the individual (just as intuitively desired by the authors of the ProPublica study, and as explictly put forward in [8] ).
We will use the notion of max-divergence to determine the "distance" between distributions; this notion, often found in areas such as differential privacy (see [7] ), represents this distance as (the logarithm of) the maximum multiplicative gap between the probabilities of some element in the respective distributions. We argue that using such a multiplicative distance is important to ensure fairness between groups or outcomes that may be under-represented in the 1 Very similar notions of fairness appear also in [5, 9] using different names.
data. 2 Furthermore, as can be seen in [10] , such a notion is closed under "post-processing": if a classifier C satisfies ϵ-fair treatment with respect to a context P = (D, f , д, O), then for any (possibly probabilistic) function M, C ′ (·) = M(C(·)) will also satisfy ϵ-fair treatment with respect to P. Closure under post-processing is important as we ultimately want the decision-maker to act on the output of the classifier, and we would like the decision-maker's output to be fair whenever they act only on the classifier's output. 3 As shown in the ProPublica study, the COMPAS classifier does not satisfy ϵ-fair treatment even for somewhat large ϵ. However, several recent works have presented methods to "sanitize" unfair classifiers into ones satisfying ϵ-fair treatment with only a relatively small loss in accuracy [8, 10, 13] .
Fairness for the Decision-Maker: Rational Fairness. So, classifiers satisfying ϵ-fair treatment with accuracy closely matching the optimal "unfair" classifiers are possible (in fact, classifiers such as COM-PAS can be sanitized to satisfy ϵ-fair treatment, without losing too much in accuracy). Additionally, as we have noted, the notion of fair treatment is closed under post-processing, so any mechanism that is applied to the output of the classifier will preserve fair treatment. Thus, intuitively, we would hope that the entire "computer-aided decision making process", where the decision-maker makes use of the classifier's output to make a decision, results in a fair outcome as long as the classifier satisfies fair treatment. Indeed, if the decision-maker simply observes the outcome of the classifier and bases their decision entirely on this outcome, this will be the case (by closure under post-processing).
So, since the notion of fair treatment is closed under such postprocessing, any mechanism that is applied to the output of the classifier will preserve fair treatment. Intuitively, we would hope that the entire computer-aided decision making process, where the decision-maker makes use of the classifier's output to make a decision, results in a fair outcome as long as the classifier satisfied fair treatment. And indeed, by post-processing, if the decisionmaker simply observes the outcome of the classifier and bases their decision entirely on this outcome, this will be the case.
But the decision-maker is not a machine; rather we ought to think of the DM as a rational agent, whose goal is to make decisions that maximize some internal utility function. (For instance, in the context of COMPAS, the DM might be a judge that wants to make sure that defendants that are likely to recidivate are sent to jail, and those who do not are released). As far as we are aware, such a computer-aided "rational" decision-making scenario has not yet been studied.
More precisely, we consider a decision-theoretic scenario where individuals σ are sampled from D, the decision-maker gets to see the group д(σ ) of the individual and the outcome c = C(σ ) of the classifier (e.g., the individual's race and risk score), selects some action x ∈ Ω DM (e.g., what sentence to render), and finally receives some utility u(f (σ ), x) that is only a function of the actual class f (σ ) (e.g., whether the individual would have recidivated) and their decision x.
Given a classification context P, a classifier C, action space Ω DM and a utility function u, let Γ P, C,Ω DM ,u denote the decision problem (i.e., the single-player Bayesian game) induced by the above process. We argue that in a computer-aided decision-making scenario, a natural fairness desideratum for a classifier C for a context P is that it should "enable fair rational decision-making". More precisely, we say that a strategy s : G P × {0, 1} * → Ω DM for the DM (which chooses an outcome based on the group of the individual and the output of the classifier) is fair if the DM ignores the individual's group д and only bases its decision on the output of the classifier-that is, there exists some s ′ : {0, 1} * → Ω DM such that s(д, o) = s ′ (o). We next say that C enables ϵ-approximately fair decision making (or simply satisfies ϵ-rational fairness) with respect to the context P = (D, f , д, O) if, for every finite action space Ω DM and every utility function u : Ψ × Ω DM → [0, 1] (i.e., depending on the individual's class and the action selected by the DM), there exists an ϵ-optimal and fair strategy s (i.e., a strategy s such that the DM cannot gain more than ϵ in utility by deviating from it) in the induced game Γ P, C,Ω DM ,u .
Note that if there exists Ω DM , u for which there does not exist some fair ϵ-optimal strategy in the induced game, then there exist situations in which a DM can gain more than ϵ in utility by discriminating between groups, and thus in such situations a rational DM (that cares about "significant" > ϵ changes in utility) would be forced to do so.
Our Main Theorem
Our main result shows that the two notions of fairness mentioned above-which both seem intuitively desirable-are largely incompatible, except in "trivial" cases. In fact, we provide a tight characterization of classification contexts that admit classifiers satisfying ϵ-fair treatment and ϵ-rational fairness.
In these "trivial" cases-for instance, when the features already enable perfect classification, or when the base rates of classes are equal between groups-constructing a fair classifier is possible (and, indeed, usually trivially so) without any significant tradeoffs. However, in non-trivial cases, when these base rates might vary significantly, we show that enforcing fairness will inevitably produce a "predictive disparity" between groups, in that the ability of the outcome of a classifier to predict an individual's true class will need to be sacrificed more in some groups than in others. And, intuitively, this predictive disparity is precisely what causes rational fairness to fail; we show constructively that there are cases where a rational DM will be incentivized to make a more "risky" decision given a group with better predictivity and a "safer" decision given a group with worse predictivity.
The case of binary classes (warm-up). As a warm-up, and to better compare our result to earlier literature, let us start by explaining our characterization for the case of binary classes. We refer to a a classification context P = (D, f , д, O) as binary if Ψ P = {0, 1}.
We say that a binary classification context P = (D, f , д, O) is ϵ-trivial if either (a) for every class c ∈ {0, 1}, the "base rates" of c are ϵ-close with respect to any pair of groups, or (b) the observable features enable perfectly distinguishing between the two classes. Formally, either of the following conditions hold:
• ("almost equal base rates"): for any two groups X, Y in G P , and any class c ∈ Ψ P , the multiplicative distance between
have disjoint support. Note that if base rates are ϵ-close, there is a trivial classifier that satisfies 0-fair treatment and ϵ-rational fairness: namely, ignore the input and simply output some canonical value. Additionally, note that if the observable features fully determine the class of the individual, there also exists a classifier trivially satisfying 0fair treatment and 0-rational fairness: simply output the correct class of the individual based on the observable features (which fully determine it by assumption). So ϵ-trivial binary classification contexts admit classifiers satisfying ϵ-fair treatment and ϵ-rational fairness. Our characterization result shows that the above contexts are the only ones which admit them. • If P is ϵ-trivial, there exists a classifier C satisfying 0-fair treatment and 2ϵ-rational fairness with respect to P. • If there exists a classifier C satisfying ϵ-fair treatment and ϵ/5-rational fairness with respect to P, then P is 4ϵ-trivial.
We note that a similar notion of triviality was considered in [5, 9] to obtain related characterizations for binary classification tasks, albeit for different definitions of fairness and "accuracy".
The general case. To deal with the general (i.e., non-binary) case, we need to consider a more general notion of a trivial context. The definition of triviality is actually somewhat different from the definition given for the binary case, but its not hard to see that for this special case the definitions are equivalent. We say that a classification context P = (D, f , д, O) is ϵ-trivial if there exists a partition of the set Ψ P into subsets Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 , . . . , Ψ m of classes such that both of the following conditions hold:
• ("base-rates conditioned on Ψ i are close"): for any i ∈ [m], for any two groups X, Y in G P , and any class c ∈ Ψ i , the multiplicative distance between
Note that in contrast to the definition given for binary context, the general definition requires that both of the above conditions hold (as opposed to just one of them). Note, however, that in case we only have 2 classes, there are only 2 possible partitions of Ψ P : either we have the trivial partition Ψ 1 = {0, 1} in which case condition 1 is equivalent to requiring equal base rates, and condition 2 trivially holds; or Ψ 1 = {0}, Ψ 2 = {1}, in which case condition 1 trivially holds, and condition 2 is equivalent to prefect distinguishability between class 0 and class 1.
Once again, if a classification context is ϵ-trivial, there exists a simple classifier that satisfies ϵ-fair treatment and O(ϵ)-rational fairness: given some observable features o, determine which subgroup Ψ i the individual belongs to (which we know can be done by the second requirement), and finally output i. Roughly speaking, this classifier satisfies 0-fair treatment since for any i and any class c ∈ Ψ i , all individuals in Ψ i receive the same outcome (namely, i). Rational fairness is a bit more tricky to prove, but roughly speaking follows from the fact that, conditioned on any classification outcome i, the group д of the individual carries "O(ϵ) information" about the actual class of the individual, and so, by ignoring it, the DM loses little in utility. Our main theorem shows that ϵ-triviality is also a necessary condition: Theorem 2. (Full characterization.) Consider some classification context P = (D, f , д, O), let ϵ ≤ 3/2 be a constant and let k = |Ψ P | (i.e., the number of classes). Then:
• If P is ϵ-trivial, there exists a classifier C satisfying 0-fair treatment and 2ϵ-rational fairness with respect to P. • If there exists a classifier C satisfying ϵ-fair treatment and ϵ/5-rational fairness with respect to P, then P is 4(k − 1)ϵtrivial.
Related Work
Several recent works also show obstacles to achieving fair classifications. Notably, the elegant result of [9] shows that (in our terminology), for non-trivial binary classification problems, there are no classifiers that satisfy ϵ-fair treatment (in fact, an expectation-based relaxation of the notion we consider) as well as a notion of ϵ-group calibration-roughly speaking, ϵ-group calibration requires that conditioned on any outcome and group, the distributions of individuals' actual classes are (approximately) "calibrated" according to the outcome. 4 Calibration, however, is best thought of as an "accuracy" notion for the classifier (rather than a fairness notion), and may not always be easy to achieve even without any concern for fairness. (Additionally, the results from [9] show a weaker bound than those we present here, namely that both of the ϵ-approximate notions they consider in conjunction imply O( √ ϵ) difference in base rates or O( √ ϵ) prediction error; we present a stronger, asymptotically tight, bound implying either O(ϵ) difference in base rates or exact perfect prediction. However, we note that this is largely due to the fact that the actual definitions employed are incomparable.) [5] presents a similar impossibility result, focusing on binary classification with a binary output. She points out a simple identity (a direct consequence of the definition of conditional probabilities) which implies that, in non-trivial binary classification contexts, and for binary classifiers (i.e., classifiers only outputting a single bit), 0-fair treatment is incompatible with a notion of perfect "predictive parity"-namely, that conditioned on the classifier outputting b, the probability that the class is b is independent of the group. While her result only applies in a quite limited setting (binary context, binary classifiers, and only rules out "perfect" fair treatment combined with "perfect" predictive parity), we will rely on an identity similar to hers in one step of our proof. We will also rely on a generalized version of a notion of predictive parity (which deals with non-binary classes, non-binary outcomes, and non-zero error in predictivity) as an intermediate notion within the proof of our main theorem.
As far as we know, no earlier results have considered the effect of having a rational decision-maker act based on the output of the classifier. However, as pointed out to us by an anonymous reviewer, for the case that ϵ = 0, Blackwell's celebrated "comparison of experiments" theorem [4] 5 be used to show an equivalence between 0-rational fairness and perfect predictive parity, and as such, a Chouldechova's result combined with Blackwell's theorem rules out non-trivial binary classifications admitting classifiers that satisfy 0-fair prediction and 0-rational fairness. Dealing with the case that ϵ > 0, however, is what interests us here: it should be no surprise that "perfect" fairness is impossible, just like "perfect" differential privacy [7] is impossible for any non-trivial task (whereas ϵ-differential privacy where ϵ > 0 is highly possible for many functions of interest!) We highlight that as far as we are aware, "approximate" analogues of Blackwell's theorem are not known; in a sense, one of our results presented in the full version of this paper, which essentially shows that approximate rational fairness implies approximate predictive parity, can be viewed as an "approximate" analog of Blackwell's theorem (with a very different type of proof).
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, none of the earlier impossibility results consider non-binary classification problems.
Proof Outline
We here provide an outline of the proof of the main theorem. We start by considering just binary classification contexts P = (D, f , д, O), and then show how to extend the proof to deal also with non-binary contexts. As mentioned above, for binary contexts, the "if" direction of the theorem (i.e., showing that trivial contexts admit fair classifiers) is immediate. The "only if" direction requires showing that the existence of a classifier C that satisfies ϵ-fair treatment as well as ϵ/5-rational fairness for a context P implies that P is O(ϵ)-trivial. The full proof is deferred to the appendix.
Predictive parity. Towards showing this, we introduce a generalized version of the notion of "predictive parity" considered in [5] (which will later also be useful in proving the "if" direction for non-binary classification). Roughly speaking, we say that a classifier satisfies ϵ-predictive parity if, for any two groups X and Y , the following distributions are ϵ-close in multiplicative distance:
That is, the output of the classifier is "equally predictive" of the actual class between groups.
Relating predictive parity and rational fairness. Our first result (which works for all, and not just binary, contexts) shows that rational fairness and predictive parity are intimately connected. First of all, ϵ-predictive parity implies O(ϵ)-rational fairness-intuitively, if a DM could gain by discriminating, then there must exist some output for the classifier for which such a gain is possible, and this contradicts predictive parity. This forward direction turns out to be useful for proving that all ϵ-trivial contexts (even non-binary ones) admit classifiers satisfying ϵ-rational fairness and ϵ-fair treatment; that is, the "if" direction of the theorem (also for non-binary contexts).
More interestingly, we show that ϵ/5 rational fairness (for ϵ < 3/2), combined with ϵ ′ -fair treatment (for any ϵ ′ ), together imply ϵ-predictive parity. Intuitively, we show this as follows. Consider some C that does not satisfy ϵ-predictive parity, yet satisfies ϵ/5rational fairness and ϵ ′ -fair treatment. This means there exists some class y * , groups д, д ′ and some outcome o such that the prevalence of y * is significantly higher in group д than in group д ′ conditioned on the classifier outputting o.
We then construct a very natural game for the DM where every fair strategy has low utility compared to the optimal unfair strategy, which would contradict rational fairness. The action space of the games consists of two actions {Risky, Safe}. If the DM chooses Safe they always receive some fixed utility u * . On the other hand, if they choose Risky, they receive 1 if the individual's class is y * and 0 otherwise. That is, playing Risky is good if the individual is "good" (i.e., in class y * ) and otherwise not.
We next show, relying on the fact that C satisfies fair treatment and the fact that the prevalence of y * is significantly higher conditioned on the DM getting the signal (o, д) than when getting (o, д ′ ), that, if we set u * (i.e, the utility of playing Safe) appropriately, the DM can always significantly gain by discriminating between д and д ′ . The intriguing aspect of this proof is that the optimal "fair" strategy for the DM turns out to be a mixed strategy (i.e., a probabilistic strategy) which mixes uniformly between the two actions Risky and Safe.
Simultaneously achieving fair treatment and predictive parity (binary contexts). Given that O(ϵ)-rational fairness combined with (any finite-error) fair treatment implies O(ϵ)-predictive parity, to prove the theorem, it will suffice to show that only trivial contexts admit classifiers that simultaneously satisfy O(ϵ)-fair treatment and O(ϵ)-predictive parity.
Towards showing this, let us first focus on binary classification contexts. We first note that, by the definition of conditional probability, for any X ∈ G P , i, j ∈ Ψ P , and o ∈ Ω C P , the following identity holds:
This identity is basically a generalization of an identity observed in [5] for the special case of binary classification tasks and binary classifiers; it relates the conditional probabilities defining fair treatment and predictive parity (the first and second terms on the left, respectively) to the base rates of classes between any two groups (the terms on the right). The same identity as above also holds substituting any Y ∈ G P for X . By applying ϵ-fair treatment and ϵ-predictive parity to these two respective identities, we get that their left-hand sides are 4ϵclose, and as a consequence we have that the ratios
and
are 4ϵ-close. (Note that, to perform these manipulations, it is important that we rely on the multiplicative distance notion; the reason we now get a distance of 4ϵ is that we apply fair treatment or predictive parity four times, and each time we do this we lose a factor of e ϵ ). For the case of binary classification contexts, letting α д b = Pr[f (σ д ) = b] denote the "base rate" of class b for group д, this means that the ratios α X
are 4ϵ-close, and thus we have that the base rates α X 1 , α Y 1 must be 4ϵ-close (and the same for α X 0 , α Y 0 ). But there is a catch. We can only apply the above identity when it is well-defined-that is, when there are no divisions by zero. In other words, we can only apply it if there exists some outcome o such that
If there is no such outcome, C perfectly distinguishes between the two classes, and thus
must have disjoint support. Hence, in either case, P is a 4ϵ-trivial context.
Simultaneously achieving fair treatment and predictive parity (general contexts). Dealing with non-binary contexts is quite a bit more involved, and we content ourselves to simply provide a very highlevel overview. (The full proof of Theorem 2 follows from the same observations about predictive parity and the same equation relating treatment and predictivity rates to base rates; however, for non-binary Ψ P , the argument is somewhat more complex.)
Consider some C that satisfies ϵ-fair treatment and ϵ-predictive parity with respect to P = (D, f , д, O); our goal is again to show that P must be O(ϵ)-trivial. At a high level, we will show either that base rates are ϵ-close or that we can split the set of classes Ψ P into proper subsets Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 such that the classifier can perfectly distinguish between these sets of classes. Once we have shown this property, we can next repeatedly rely on it to prove the theorem (more precisely, by recursively splitting up either Ψ 1 or Ψ 2 and applying the same result; formally doing this turns out to be somewhat subtle.)
To prove the above property, our goal is to use the same highlevel approach as in the binary case. Assume that there do not exist Ψ 1 and Ψ 2 such that C can perfectly distinguish between them, and let us show that then the base rates must be close. In order to apply the same argument as in the binary case, we would need to show that for all pairs of classes (i, j), the above identity can be applied. If we do this, then we have that, for all (i, j), the ratios Pr[f (σ X ) = j] Pr[f (σ X ) = i] and Pr[f (σ Y ) = j] Pr[f (σ Y ) = i] are 4ϵ-close, from which we can conclude that the base rates are 4ϵ-close. However, the fact that C cannot distinguish between two proper subsets of classes does not mean that all classes are "ambiguous" with respect to C (in the sense that C cannot perfectly tell them apart, and thus the identity is well-defined). Instead, what we show is that, under the assumption that there do not exist two proper subsets of classes between which C can perfectly distinguish, we have that, between any two classes i and j, there exists a sequence of classes (i 1 , . . . , i n ) such that n ≤ k (k being the number of classes), i 1 = i, i n = j, and any two consecutive classes must be "ambiguous". Ambiguity between classes with respect to C turns out to be exactly the condition under which the above identity is well defined. At a very high level, we can then perform a "hybrid argument" over the classes in the sequence to still conclude that, for all pairs of classes (i, j), the ratios
and Pr[f (σ Y ) = j] Pr[f (σ Y ) = i] are 4(k − 1)ϵ-close; this suffices to conclude that the base rates between groups are close.
